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must automatically switch between incremental unsupervised
clustering, when predictive feedback is unavailable, and super-
vised clustering, when predictive feedback is available, without a
loss of memory stability, to learn categories that are sensitive to
both environmental statistics and cultural constraints. ARTMAP
algorithms achieved this goal by combining top-down matching
and attention with vigilance or sensitivity control that together
maximize generalization while minimizing predictive error using
a patented concept called match tracking (Carpenter & Grossberg
1991). In this regard, S&B discuss distinguishing between edible
and nonedible mushrooms, notably the need to distinguish “fine
shades of orange” (sect. 2.2) in mushroom databases. However,
they do not simulate classical mushroom databases (Schlimmer
1987). ARTMAP has been benchmarked on the mushroom data-
base with a 99.8% accuracy during on-line learning (Carpenter et
al. 1991).
S&B also note the importance of studying “categorization and
naming by humans” (sect. 1), but do not do model human per-
formance. ARTMAP has simulated the set of thirty human cate-
gorization experiments, called the 5–4 category structure (Smith
& Minda 2000), which is a standard benchmark for human cate-
gorization (Ersoy et al. 2002). Whereas traditional cognitive mod-
els can fit these data, they do so without learning the categories
and without describing underlying brain dynamics. ARTMAP
learns the categories and fits the data at least as well as cognitive
models, and also proposes how to settle the classical exemplar/
prototype debate concerning whether exemplars or prototypes
are stored in memory. ARTMAP predicts that critical feature pat-
terns to which humans learn to pay attention are stored in mem-
ory. Under language/cultural supervision, these prototypes can
be either specific (“exemplars”; Estes 1994; Medin & Smith,
1981; Medin et al. 1983) or general (“prototypes”; Posner &
Keele 1970; Smith & Minda 1998; 2000; Smith et al. 1997). Typ-
ically, both specific and general information will be learned
(“rule-plus-exceptions”; Nosofsky 1984; 1987; Nosofsky et al.
1992; Palmeri et al. 1994).
ARTMAP is a standard tool for learning complex categorical re-
lationships from high-dimensional input vectors that include color
among other visual features, while autonomously discovering hi-
erarchical knowledge relationships among the categories (Car-
penter et al. 2004a; 2004b; Parsons & Carpenter 2003).
S&B summarize familiar features of neural models of super-
vised learning using nomenclature about games. Although these
games sound novel, they actually embody well-known neural
modeling concepts, including memory search or hypothesis test-
ing to create new categories, the use of predictive success to cul-
turally constrain learned naming, and the need to control category
size. All of these properties are unified and proceed automatically
in ARTMAP algorithms. It remains for S&B to demonstrate,
through comparative benchmarks, that their models can cope with
the categorical challenges that this alternative approach has al-
ready handled.
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Abstract: Consideration of color alone can give a misleading impression
of the three approaches to category coordination: the nativist, empiricist
and culturalist models. Empiricist models can benefit from a wider range
of correlational information in the environment. Also, all three approaches
may explain a set of perceptual categories within the human repertoire.
Finally, a suggestion is offered for supplementing the naming game by
varying the social status of agents.
The broad conclusion drawn by Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) on the
basis of their explorations of three general models for category
name coordination is that, whereas the genetic and the cultural/
language-based models can lead to coordinated categorization
and naming practices within populations, the statistical structure
available for colors in the immediate environment is insufficient
to allow the empiricist model to achieve the same level of perfor-
mance.
The latter claim is critically dependent on the choice of envi-
ronmental structure provided to the empiricist model. S&B ex-
plored only one source of structure – a random sampling of pixels
taken from photos of environmental scenes. Before drawing any
firm conclusion about the possibility of achieving full coordination
of categories simply from statistical covariation in the world, a
more realistic characterization of the environment is surely nec-
essary. In particular, colors are not seen by individuals as inde-
pendent pixels, but as reflectances of the surfaces of objects and
parts of the visual scene, which can be tracked through space and
time as the individual moves through the scene. Other visual prop-
erties such as shape and size of the color patch, where it is located
relative to objects in the scene, and sensory properties from other
modalities all provide rich sources of correlational structure which
establish a categorization of the world. Coordination of color cat-
egories may then benefit from the association of colors with ob-
ject classes (oranges are typically orange, lemons typically yellow,
the sky typically blue, blood red, and so forth). To take one of their
examples, if coordination of color categories is important for the
detection of poisonous mushrooms, then it is unrealistic to sup-
pose that the morphology, size, smell, and habitat of the mush-
room will not also play a role in categorization – and hence pro-
vide crucial evidence about where to draw the color category
boundary in this instance. It is therefore an empirical question
whether a richer modeling of the statistical structure in the envi-
ronment would be sufficient to allow a purely empiricist model to
develop coordinated categories as efficiently as the other two
model types.
Presenting the three approaches to the problem as mutually
contrasting accounts may also be misleading. Human categorizers
(and human cultures that develop category systems) form and
name categories on the basis of a wide range of sources of infor-
mation. It is easy to find prima facie candidates for perceptual cat-
egories that are grounded in each of the three models explored –
genetic, empirical, or cultural. Coordination of names for basic
emotions such as happiness and grief, or bodily states such as
hunger, thirst, or fatigue is presumably based on our common ge-
netics. Coordination of names for biological classes probably re-
lies on the fact that the similarity structure of biological classes at
an intermediate level (e.g., elephant, tiger) contains clearly de-
fined clusters with high within-cluster similarity and low between-
cluster similarity, giving relatively universal taxonomic systems
across different cultures at this level (Lopez et al. 1997). Artifact
classification at the basic level may similarly rely solely on high
levels of distinctiveness (Rosch et al. 1976). Other categories that
depend more on language may be found in culturally-specific cat-
egories relating to social practices. For example, classification of
ceramics, painting, or music in terms of different artistic styles, or
notions of good and bad taste in clothing or decoration are per-
ceptually grounded, but may depend heavily on language for their
coordination. It is only the fact of having the concept in the lan-
guage that leads the language learner to attend to the relevant per-
ceptual cues and construct the necessary prototype representa-
tions. A wider view of perceptual categories suggests therefore
that the three approaches considered by S&B – nativism, empiri-
cism, and culturalism – all have their place in explaining the rich
repertoire of human concepts.
My final comment relates to the cultural model itself. S&B’s
model assumes a fully cooperative pair of individuals in the lan-
guage game. Each is willing to adapt his/her categorization and us-
age of language in the service of improving communication. In ac-
tual human societies, the degree of cooperation may be less
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evident. The right to determine how things are categorized and
named is not so evenly distributed. Children are expected to con-
form to adult norms. In Western cultures, social classes whose ed-
ucation has given them greater access to the elaborated use of lan-
guage (Bernstein 1981) may determine that there are right and
wrong ways in which to classify and name the world. For an in-
creasing number of domains, the correct use of a word is the
province of an expert – Putnam’s Division of Linguistic Labor (Put-
nam 1975) – to whom other language users are inclined (and ex-
pected) to defer (Kalish 1995). It would be an interesting exercise
for S&B to consider introducing differing levels of social status in
the naming game. Agents of lower status would be willing to adapt
their representations rapidly, whereas agents of higher status
would hold on to their beliefs longer in the face of disagreement,
particularly if the interlocutor was of lower status than themselves.
It would be fascinating to know if introducing this dimension into
the game leads to quicker coordination of categories throughout
the community, and whether the higher or lower status players end
up showing greater or less variance as a subclass of agents.
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Abstract: Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B’s) simulations contain all the right
components, but they are put together wrongly. Color categories are un-
representative of categories in general and language is not merely naming.
Language evolved because it provided a powerful new way to acquire cat-
egories (through instruction, rather than just the old way of other species,
through trial-and-error experience). It did not evolve so that multiple
agents looking at the same objects could let one another know which of
the objects they had in mind, co-coining names for them on the fly.
Contra Wittgenstein (1953), language is not a game. (Maynard-
Smith [1982] would no doubt plead nolo contendere.) The game
is life, and language evolved (and continues to perform) in life’s
service – although it has since gained a certain measure of auton-
omy too.
So are Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) inquiring into the functional
role for which language evolved, the supplementary roles for
which it has since been coopted, or merely the role something pos-
sibly resembling language might play in robotics (another supple-
ment to our lives)?
For if S&B are studying the functional role for which language
evolved, that role is almost certainly absent from the experimen-
tal conditions that they are simulating. Their computer simula-
tions do not capture the ecological conditions under which, and
for which, language began. The tasks and environments set for
S&B’s simulated creatures were not those that faced any human
or prehuman ancestor, nor would they have led to the evolution of
language had they been. On the contrary, the tasks faced by our
prelinguistic ancestors (as well as our nonlinguistic contempo-
raries) are precisely the ones left out of S&B’s simulations.
S&B do make two fleeting references to a world in which for-
agers need to learn to recognize and sort mushrooms by kind –
with color possibly serving as one of the features on the basis of
which they sort. But a task like learning to sort mushrooms by kind
is not what S&B simulate here. They simulate the task of sorting
colors, and not by kind, but by a kind of “odd man out” exercise
called the “discrimination game.” In this game, the agent sees a
number of different colors (the “context”), of which one (the
“topic”) is the one that must be discriminated from the rest. If 
this is done by two agents, it is called the “guessing game,” with
the speaker both discriminating and naming the topic-color, and
the hearer having to guess which of the visible context-colors the
speaker named. Both agents see all the context-colors.
Now the first thing we must ask is: (i) Were any of our prelin-
guistic ancestors ever faced with a task anything like this? (ii) And
if they had been, would that have led to the evolution of language?
(iii) Indeed, is what is going on in S&B’s task language at all?
I would like to suggest that the answer to all three questions is
no. S&B’s is not an ecologically valid task; it is not a canonical prob-
lem that our prelinguistic ancestors encountered, for which lan-
guage evolved as the solution. And even if we trained contempo-
rary animals to do something like it (as some comparative
psychologists have done, e.g., Leavens et al. 1996), it would not be
a linguistic task – indeed it would hardly even be a categorization
task, but more like a joint multiple-choice task requiring some
“mind-reading” (Premack & Woodruff 1978; Tomasello 1999)
plus some coordination (Fussell & Krauss 1992; Markman & Ma-
kin 1998).
On the other hand, there is no doubt that our own ancestors,
once language had evolved, did face tasks like this, and that lan-
guage helped them perform such tasks. But language helps us per-
form many tasks (even learning to ride a bicycle or to do synchro-
nized swimming) for which language is not necessary, for which it
did not evolve, and which are not themselves linguistic tasks. (This
is S&B’s “chicken/egg” problem, but in a slightly different key.)
Let’s now turn to something that is ecologically valid. Our
prelinguistic ancestors (and their nonlinguistic contemporaries, as
well as our own) did face the problem of categorization and cate-
gory learning. They did have to know or learn what to do with dif-
ferent kinds of things, in order to survive and reproduce: what to
eat or not eat, what to approach or avoid, what kind of thing to do
with what kind of thing, and so forth. But categorizing is not the
same as discriminating (Harnad 1987). We discriminate things
that are present simultaneously, or in close succession; hence, dis-
crimination is a relative judgment, not an absolute one. You don’t
have to identify what the things are in order to be able to discern
whether two things are the same thing or different things, or
whether this thing is more like that thing or that thing. Catego-
rization, in contrast, calls for an absolute judgment of a thing in
isolation: “What kind of thing is this?” And the identification need
not be a name; it can simply be doing the kind of thing that you
need to do with that kind of thing (flee from it, mate with it, or
gather and save it for a rainy day).
So categorization tasks have not only ecological validity, but cog-
nitive universality (Harnad 2004). None of our fancier cognitive
capacities would be possible if we could not categorize. In partic-
ular, if we could not categorize, we could not name. To be able to
identify a thing correctly, in isolation, with its name, I need to be
able to discriminate it absolutely, not just relatively – that is, not
just from the alternatives that happen to be copresent with it at
the time (S&B’s “context”), but from all other things I encounter,
past, present, and (one hopes) future, with which it could be con-
fused. (Categorization is not necessarily exact and infallible. I may
be able to name things correctly based on what I have sampled to
date, but tomorrow I may encounter an example that I not only
cannot categorize correctly, but that shows that all my categoriza-
tion to date has been merely approximate too.)
Notice that I said categorize correctly. That is the other element
missing from S&B’s analyses. For S&B, there are three ways in
which things can be categorized: (N) innately (“nativism”), (E) ex-
perientially (“empiricism”), and (C) culturally (“culturalism,” al-
though one wonders why S&B consider cultural effects nonem-
pirical!). To be fair, the way S&B put it is that these are the three
ways in which categories can come to be shared – but clearly one
must have categories before one can share them (the chicken/egg
problem again!).
Where do the S&B agents’ color categories come from? They
seem to think that categories come from the “statistical structure”
of the things in the world, such as how much things resemble one
another physically, how frequently they occur and cooccur, and
how this is reflected in their effects on our sensorimotor trans-
ducers. This is the gist of S&B’s factor E, empiricism. Where the
statistical structure has been picked up by evolution (another em-
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